Email, Oct 2, 2012
I hope you enjoyed your test this morning, and that you are by now
persuaded that sqrt(3) is irrational. On Thursday we will start the next
component of the class, which will deal with law. To keep the total
work load for this week from becoming burdensome, I will keep the first
assignment light. In particular:
[A] Prof. Kazdan several times has made the comment that mathematics
is 'easier' than other subjects (like epidemiology, or law, or what
not). What did he mean by this? Is the idea that the other subjects
are 'applied' disciplines? If so, would he say the same thing about
physics, or about applied mathematics? Would it make a difference if,
instead of 'mathematics,' he had said 'proof in mathematics' (and
'proof in epidemiology' and 'proof in law')? Or was he perhaps
joking? If so, does that make a difference to the value of his
observation? Does it make you more or less likely to accept it as a
proof?
Let's generalize a bit, and instead of 'proof' talk about 'standards of
argument.' How do the standards of argument in mathematics differ from
the standards in other disciplines X? (Pick your own values of X:
e.g., philosophy, history, French literature, paleontology, marketing,
veterinary medicine.) If mathematical proof is a matter of persuading
an audience (recall the classroom discussion of the proof that every
number is interesting), then how does it differ from rhetoric? Or is
there something else going on? Is it possible to formulate a concept
of a fully rigorous mathematical proof, entirely free of gaps or
mistakes or unstated assumptions? (Note: the work of Euclid, or Euler,
or Newton is full of such shortcomings, which often took years to
notice, and then further years of intensive effort to correct.) Is a
notion of fully rigorous proof possible in other disciplines X? Why or
why not? Do some disciplines come closer to the ideal than others?
Why?
There is nothing to write: just think about the questions, and come to
class with something to say
[B] To help your thinking, and to prepare the transition to law,
please read the attached article from the New Yorker. It reports the
story of a man accused of murdering his family by arson; he was tried,
convicted, and executed, but almost certainly on bogus scientific
evidence. The article is not conceptually difficult, but raises
important questions about legal proof, expert witnesses, objectivity of
prosecutors, reliability of juries, the 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' standard of proof, and much more. If you do not have time
to read it, at least skim it so that you get the gist of the argument.
The fact-checkers for the New Yorker, by the way, are famously careful
and precise -- so you might ask yourself about the standards of
proof expected for a literary magazine, and how they compare to the
'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of proof as exhibited in
this capital case.
[C] The next item is more difficult, but we will not discuss it in
detail until next Tuesday. But here it is. It is the recent Supreme
Court case of Scott v. Harris. It involves Mr. Harris, a young man (19
at the time) who was observed speeding in rural Georgia -- not
outrageously, but about 15 miles over the limit. The police turned on
their sirens; Harris, who was driving without a license, panicked, and
sped away. The police gave chase. After a lengthy pursuit, Officer
Scott finally rammed Harris from behind, causing a serious crash, and
leaving Harris paralyzed from the neck down.
The case (opinion by Justice Scalia,
solitary dissent by Justice
Stevens -- the vote was 8-1) -- is short, and you should have
no difficulty in following it. But for the non-law students, here are
some points to observe.
- Harris sued Officer Scott. He argued that Scott, in ramming his
car at high speed, and in employing deadly force for what was in effect
a speeding ticket, was acting unreasonably. (Specifically, that he
violated the 4th Amendment of the US Constitution, which prohibits
'unreasonable searches and seizures.' Ramming is legally a
seizure. Technical stuff: the law suit against a state police officer
is authorized by a federal statute -- the famous '�1983'
-- which is why this case is in federal rather than state court.
Nothing for us turns on that fact.)
- Some jargon. Initially the case would have been called
'Harris v. Scott'; the names are given in the order,
'Plaintiff v. Defendant.' But because Scott appealed, he now
becomes the moving party (i.e. the person asking the court to do
something), and the case, for this stage of the proceedings, becomes
'Scott v. Harris.' Scott is now called the petitioner, and
Harris the respondent.
- Observe that this is a civil action, not criminal. That is
important. If it were criminal, Harris would have to prove his case to
a jury 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' That would be almost
impossible, given the facts in the case. But in a civil trial --
we shall talk a lot about this distinction -- the standard is much
more relaxed: Harris must only persuade the jury that his case is
'more likely than not' to be true. ('More likely than
not' is generally understood to mean p > 50%. The inequality is
strict; can you see why? Can you think of real-life cases where you
might have p = 50%?)
- Scott argues that he has a 'qualified immunity' from
suit. Basically, 'absolute immunity' means that you cannot
be sued, whatever the circumstances. (For example, if you have
diplomatic immunity, or if you are a judge and the losing party wants
to sue you for bad judging.) 'Qualified immunity' means you
are immune unless certain facts can be established. This bit of the
legal doctrine is complicated, and has changed since the case was
decided: the details do not matter to us. Basically (and simplifying
slightly) for Scott to lose his immunity, Harris must show (1) that
Scott violated his constitutional rights, and (2) that the right was
clearly established (so that the violation was unreasonable: one
can't expect police officers to know every latest shading of
criminal procedure).
- Scott asked the federal trial court (= the 'District
Court') to grant him 'summary judgment' on the question
of qualified immunity. That is, he asked the District Court judge to
decide, as a matter of law, that he was immune. The judge rejected his
motion. Scott therefore appealed to a second court, the Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit. Scott's appeal is what is known as
an 'interlocutory appeal.' That is (and in contrast to most
appeals), it occurs before the case goes to trial -- so before a
jury has a chance to decide on the factual issues. Can you see why the
interlocutory appeal was granted?
- Related question. In this situation, in evaluating a motion for
summary judgment, the court must interpret the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, i.e. Harris. Can you see why
this is the rule? The Court of Appeals (three judges), taking the
facts to be as alleged in Harris's complaint, agreed with the
trial judge.
- Extremely important point. It is a fundamental rule of American
law that decisions about matters of fact are to be decided by the
jury. Only decisions about matters of law are for the judge. The
question about whether Scott acted 'reasonably' is a factual
matter: the basic idea is, let the jurors hear the testimony of both
sides, and then render their verdict.
- However, in very unusual cases -- this is one -- the court
may conclude that no reasonable jury could reach a particular verdict.
In that case, it grants the motion for 'summary judgment.'
(There are other bits of jargon -- 'directed verdict,'
'judgment as a matter of law,' 'judgment notwithstanding
the verdict' -- but they all come to the same thing. The
court says that only highly unreasonable people could see the facts in
any other way than the court, and it takes the decision away from the
jury.) It is a very high standard -- in effect, you are saying
that anybody who disagrees with your view of the facts is a bit crazy.
- I note that one Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court -- Stevens
-- viewed the factual matters differently than his colleagues.
This may explain the tone of his dissent. The attitude of the four
lower-court judges does not appear to be recorded.
- Crucial to the decision was the existence of a video of the
chase. It is available on YouTube. Here is the link.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrVKSgRZ2GY
You need not watch the entire thing; but please watch the first minute
or so, and then the concluding two or three minutes. You should also
look at the comments that viewers have appended to the video.
I note again: Scott v. Harris is for next week. For Thursday, please
just think about the questions about proof, read the
New Yorker article, and maybe look at the video.
I look forward to seeing you on Thursday.
Best wishes,
Bill Ewald