Mathematical Cryptography Diffie Hellman, Discrete Log Problem, Collision Algorithms

#### Mentor: Tao Song , Mentee: Lisette del Pino

University of Pennsylvania Directed Reading Program

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- In private, your friend computes  $A' \equiv A^b \mod p$
- $\circ$  This is the shared value. B' and A' are the same.
- <sup>(8)</sup> Proof:  $A' \equiv B^a \equiv g^{ba} \equiv A^b \equiv B' \mod p$

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- 5 The shared value is  $470 \equiv 627^{347*781} \mod 941$

Recall eavesdroppers know these values :  $A, B, g^a, g^b, g, p$  And they need to find:  $g^{ab}$  This problem is no harder than the Discrete Logarithm Problem

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recall elements of a finite multiplicative group  $\mathbb{F}_p^*$  with a generator g are:

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where  $g^{p-1} \equiv 1 \mod p$  by Fermat's Little Theorem.

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Recall that computing the shared value  $g^{ab}$  is no harder than solving the Discrete Log Problem. **Discrete Log Problem:** Given a primitive root (generator) g of a finite group  $G = \mathbb{F}_p^*$  Recall that computing the shared value  $g^{ab}$  is no harder than solving the Discrete Log Problem. **Discrete Log Problem:** Given a primitive root (generator) g of a finite group  $G = \mathbb{F}_p^*$  and  $h \neq 0 \in G = \mathbb{F}_1^*$  Recall that computing the shared value  $g^{ab}$  is no harder than solving the Discrete Log Problem. **Discrete Log Problem:** Given a primitive root (generator) g of a finite group  $G = \mathbb{F}_p^*$  and  $h \neq 0 \in G = \mathbb{F}_1^*$ find an x such that  $g^x \equiv h \mod p$ 

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Proof: if x solves  $g^x \equiv h \mod p$ , then so does  $x + k(p-1) \forall k$ 

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Proof: if x solves  $g^x \equiv h \mod p$ , then so does  $x + k(p-1) \forall k$  we have:

$$g^{x+k(p-1)} = g^x g^{p-1^k} = h * 1^k \equiv h \mod p$$

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**Discrete Log Problem:** find an x such that  $g^x \equiv h \mod p$ We can also restate the D.L.P in terms of Group Theory: Let  $g \in G$ , G is a finite group. x is a positive integer and star is the group operation.

$$g^{\times} = g * g * g * \dots * g$$

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## Order of a Group, Order of an Element

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also,

$$\lim_{x \to +\infty} \frac{f(x)}{g(x)}$$

exists and is finite

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 $O(2^k)$ 

for the trial and error method. Pretty awful.

## Fast Exponentiation

## Computers brute forcing the D.L.P use the Fast Exponentiation Method

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For our computer then, the runtime is

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for the trial and error method. Still exponential time.

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- Find a match between your two lists. If it exists, it's g<sup>i</sup> = hg<sup>-jn</sup>, i, j indices
- 6 Then x = i + jn is a solution to  $g^x \equiv h \mod p$

**1** Use order of the group as estimate. Solve  $3^x \equiv 19 \mod{59}$ 

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 $3^1 \equiv 3 \mod 59$  $3^{-1} \equiv 20 \mod 59$  $3^2 \equiv 9 \mod 59$  $3^{-8} \equiv 20^8 \mod 59 \equiv 5 \mod 59$  $3^3 \equiv 27 \mod 59$  $19(3^{-8}) \equiv 19(20^8) \equiv 19(5) \equiv 36 \mod 59$  $3^4 \equiv 22 \mod 59$  $19(3^{-16}) \equiv 19(20^{16}) \equiv 19(25) \equiv 3 \mod 59$  $3^5 \equiv 7 \mod 59$  $3^6 \equiv 21 \mod 59$  $3^7 \equiv 4 \mod 59$  $3^8 \equiv 12 \mod 59$ 3We're done! We found a match!

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 Thus,  ${}^{\scriptstyle 317}\equiv 19\,$  mod 59

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## Chinese Remainder Theorem

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 $x \equiv a_1 \mod m_1, x \equiv a_2 \mod m_2, ..., x \equiv a_k \mod m_k$ 

has a solution  $x = c \mod m_1 * \ldots * m_k$  that is unique.

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has a solution  $x = c \mod m_1 * ... * m_k$  that is unique. The C.R.T allows us to solve systems of modular congruences.

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 $G = F_p^*, g \in G$  has a prime power order.  $g \in G$  has order  $q^e$ , so  $g^{q^e} \equiv e \mod p$ Then this algorithm lets us solve D.L.P in  $O(Sq^e)$  steps. In our worst case, where we can't decompose p into small primes, we use Shanks instead, so  $q^e = g^{e1/2} = \sqrt{N}$ 

if our order factors into primes, then:

$$N = q_2^{e_2}, q_2^{e_2}, ..., q_t^{e_t}$$

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#### Pohlig Hellman Algorithm Procedure

$${f 1} \quad orall 1 \leq i \leq t$$
, let  $g_i = g^{N/q_i^{e_i}}$  and let  $h_i = h^{N/q_i^{e_i}}$ 

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- 2 since  $g_i$  has prime power order  $q_i^{e_{is}}$ , we meed to solve each Discrete Log Problem  $g_i^y = h_i$
- 3 Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to solve each modular congruence

$$x_1 \equiv y_1 \mod q_1^{e_1}, ..., x_t \equiv y_t \mod q_t^{e_t}$$

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In reality, we might be able to get a much smaller runtime than Shanks, which is why we write that step 1 takes:

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And Step 2 has a neglifible computation time. Solving modular congrunces using C.R.T tajes only O(logN) steps

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- 2 Find relatively prime factors of 30, 5 \* 6
- 3 set first equation using first factor

$$x = 5^0 a_0 + 5^1 a_1 = a_0 + 5a_1$$

4 raise to second factor

$$(3^{a_0+5a_1})^6 \equiv 22^6 \mod 31$$

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Then,

$$3^{6a_0+30a_1} \equiv 22^6 \mod 31$$

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$$3^{6a_0}(3^{a_1})^{30} \equiv 3^{6a_0} * 1 \equiv 8 \mod 31$$

by F.L.T

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1

Then,
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 $3^{6a_0}(3^{a_1})^{30}\equiv 3^{6a_0}*1\equiv 8\mod 31$ by F.L.T

$$(3^6)^{a_0} = 229^{a_0} = 16^{a_0} \equiv 8 \mod 31$$

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Then,  

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by F.L.T  
 $(3^6)^{a_0}=229^{a_0}=16^{a_0}\equiv 8 \mod 31$ 

Trial and error/Shanks gives  $16^2 \equiv 8 \mod 31$ , so  $a_0 = 2$ , our 2 first equation is then

$$x = 2 + 5a_1$$

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Mathematical Cryptography

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1 set second equation using second factor

$$x = 6^0 b_0 + 6^1 b_1 = b_0 + 6b_1$$

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set second equation using second factor

$$x = 6^0 b_0 + 6^1 b_1 = b_0 + 6b_1$$

2 raise to first factor

$$(3^{b_0+6b_1})^5 \equiv 22^5 \mod 31$$

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1 Then,

$$3^{5b_0+30b_1} \equiv 22^5 \mod 31$$

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Then,

$$3^{5b_0+30b_1} \equiv 22^5 \mod 31$$

$$3^{5b_0}(3^{b_1})^{30} \equiv 3^{5b_0} * 1 \equiv 6 \mod 31$$

by F.L.T

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Then,
$$3^{5b_0+30b_1}\equiv 22^5\mod 31$$
 $3^{5b_0}(3^{b_1})^{30}\equiv 3^{5b_0}*1\equiv 6\mod 31$ by F.L.T

$$(3^5)^{b_0} = 243^{b_0} = 26^{b_0} \equiv 6 \mod 31$$

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Then,  

$$3^{5b_0+30b_1} \equiv 22^5 \mod 31$$
  
 $3^{5b_0}(3^{b_1})^{30} \equiv 3^{5b_0}*1 \equiv 6 \mod 31$   
by F.L.T  
 $(3^5)^{b_0} = 243^{b_0} = 26^{b_0} \equiv 6 \mod 31$ 

Trial and error/Shanks gives  $26^5 \equiv 6 \mod 31$ , so  $b_0 = 5$ , our 2 second equation is then

$$x = 5 + 6b_1$$

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1 Then, our two moduar congrunces are

 $x \equiv 2 \mod 5, x \equiv 5 \mod 6$ 

3 So  $3^{17} \equiv 22 \mod 31$ 

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1 Then, our two moduar congrunces are

 $x \equiv 2 \mod 5, x \equiv 5 \mod 6$ 

2 so now just use C.R.T to solve :

x = 17

solves both.

3 So  $3^{17} \equiv 22 \mod 31$ 

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Use multiplicative groups of large (at least 4000 bit) prime order to encrypt information!

Use multiplicative groups of large (at least 4000 bit) prime order to encrypt information! In cryptography, you're always designing against the best known decryption algorithm and its runtime Use multiplicative groups of large (at least 4000 bit) prime order to encrypt information! In cryptography, you're always designing against the best known decryption algorithm and its runtime Longer decryption times with groups defined on elliptic curves